Monthly Intelligence Report: July 2026 Oil and Rates

The Monthly Intelligence Report, Issue 3, July 2026

Short answer: a ceasefire can take the war premium out of crude oil in days. It cannot reopen a closed refinery. The United States has shut roughly 550,000 barrels per day of refining capacity in the last 18 months, so the floor under fuel prices has reset higher in every scenario, and the Federal Reserve is boxed in by an inflation source that interest rates cannot fix. That is the argument of this monthly intelligence report, along with the specific numbers that would prove it wrong.

Data runs through July 31, 2026. Sources are named inline throughout, and the primary ones are listed at the end.

What is the core thesis?

Everyone watching this war is watching the price of oil. That is the wrong gauge.

Here is the war, measured honestly. On July 12, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed. The next day, the President of the United States declared it open. The ships have answered for themselves: ten transits on July 23 in the International Monetary Fund’s PortWatch ship-tracking data, where close to 90 transit calls a day passed before the war, and just two in the latest daily count from tracking firm Kpler. The gas station at the end of your street repriced its sign this month because of it.

The price you actually pay, at the pump, in shipping costs, in every good that moves by truck, comes from two things: the cost of crude oil, and the capacity to refine it into fuel.

Crude has an off-ramp. If the mediated peace effort now underway, reportedly led by Oman with Qatar, Pakistan, and Egypt involved, produces a deal, crude gives back its war premium in days. This week alone proved the mechanism in both directions: a pause in United States strikes knocked oil down 6% in a day, an attempted Iranian missile attack on American forces snapped it back up 6.6%, and reports of talks over the strait eased it again by Friday. Crude swung more than $8 in five days on headlines, exactly as it did when June’s ceasefire took 25% off the price in two weeks.

Refining has no off-ramp. The United States has shut down roughly 550,000 barrels per day of refining capacity in the last 18 months, and as of December 2025 the refineries still running were operating at 94.8% of capacity, according to Energy Information Administration data, with closures since then removing what little slack remained. The Energy Information Administration, the federal government’s energy statistics agency, projects inventories of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel heading toward their lowest levels since 2000. A ceasefire reopens a shipping lane. It does not reopen a refinery. Closed refineries stay closed.

What changed this month?

• The ceasefire collapsed on July 7, a strike pause came and went, and negotiations now center on the strait itself. After roughly two weeks of nightly United States strikes, Washington paused them to give diplomacy room. The pause broke within days. Oman presented Tehran a Gulf-backed proposal, reported by Reuters and Iranian media, for partial Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz with voluntary transit fees. Iran rejected it, and talks continue. Why it matters: the war’s central negotiation is now explicitly about the chokepoint this issue is built around.
• Oil closed out July with its biggest monthly gain since March, up roughly 20%, ending the week near $85 to $89 a barrel after swinging more than $8 in five days, then sliding to the low $80s on signals that direct talks may be imminent. Why it matters: July’s average fuel costs print higher than June’s, and the size of the weekly swings tells you how headline-hostage this price now is.
• The economy slowed to a 1.5% growth rate in the second quarter, down from 2.1% in the first, below expectations, in Bureau of Economic Analysis data. The personal saving rate fell to 2.7%, its lowest in nearly four years, with spending growing faster than income. Why it matters: households are already funding the squeeze out of savings, before July’s fuel surge even reaches them.
• June inflation came in sharply lower. The Consumer Price Index, the government’s main inflation gauge, fell 0.4% in June, the largest one-month drop since April 2020, bringing the annual rate from 4.2% down to 3.5%, per the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Gasoline alone fell 9.7% in the month. Why it matters: this proves the transmission works in both directions. Oil down moved inflation down within weeks. Oil is now up.
• The temporary tariff became a permanent one. The 10% global import surcharge imposed in February expired by law at 12:01 a.m. on July 24. The same minute, the United States Trade Representative’s replacement tariffs took effect: 10% to 12.5% on goods from roughly 60 countries, covering about 99% of United States imports, with no expiration date. Why it matters: the one scheduled disinflationary event on the calendar was cancelled in real time.
• Mortgage rates climbed back through 6.5%. Freddie Mac’s weekly national survey printed 6.43%, then 6.49%, then 6.55%, then 6.58%, then 6.66% across July’s five surveys, the last of them the highest in a full year. Why it matters: housing demand in our coverage markets responds visibly when rates cross 6.5%, and every weekly survey since early July has been above it.
• The strait that carried a fifth of the world’s oil before the war is effectively closed to commercial shipping. Before the crisis it averaged close to 90 transit calls a day in PortWatch data. On July 23 it recorded ten. Iranian-backed forces in Yemen attacked two Saudi tankers and declared an embargo on Saudi-linked shipping, threatening a second chokepoint in the Red Sea.
• The United States joined Japan in propping up the yen. The Treasury bought yen alongside Japanese authorities during New York trading hours, a step with almost no modern precedent, since confirmed by Japan’s Finance Ministry. Estimates of that single operation run from roughly $53 billion to $59 billion. Why it matters: Japan is the largest foreign holder of United States government debt, at roughly $1.1 trillion, and it has funded its yen defense partly by selling those holdings, $29.6 billion in the first quarter alone.
• The labor market looks fine on the surface and strange underneath. Unemployment fell to 4.2% in June, but it fell because 720,000 people left the labor force entirely. Participation hit 61.5%, a five-year low. Weekly layoff filings sit at 208,000, near two-month lows, in Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Labor data. Why it matters: companies are not firing. People are exiting.

How accurate is this prediction scorecard?

Graded accuracy is about 54% across 39 logged predictions. Separately, this publication watches 109 economic indicators every month, which is coverage, not forecasting. Blurring those two numbers together is how newsletters manufacture impressive-sounding accuracy claims, and this one will not do it.

A prediction here is a specific claim, with a number and a deadline, written down before the outcome is known, where being wrong is possible. The grading is discounted on purpose. A weather forecaster who predicts between 30 and 110 degrees tomorrow will be right every day and useful never, so before any prediction is logged, the normal movement of its target is written down first, and a prediction that gives itself a wide, easy range earns less credit for a hit than one that takes a tight, risky range. Predictions that only check the model against itself are excluded. That discounting is why the published 54% sits below the raw hit rate.

Resolved since the last issue

• June CPI deceleration (M-260620-01): HIT. Logged June 20, calling June headline inflation decelerating to 4.1% or below from May’s 4.2%. Actual: 3.5%, released July 14 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• Fed holds through the second quarter (M-003): HIT. The Federal Reserve held its policy rate at 3.50% to 3.75% through June.
• Second-quarter mortgage range 5.8% to 6.8% (M-004): HIT. Freddie Mac weekly rates held inside the band all quarter.
• June mortgage average 6.20% to 6.70% (M-029): HIT. June averaged roughly 6.49%.
• Gold floor at $4,200 (M-007): MISS. Gold spent June below that floor, closing the month near $4,014.
• Gold June average $4,500 to $4,800 (M-022): MISS. June averaged well under the band. Two gold misses in one quarter is a pattern, and it is ours to own: safe-haven demand was overweighted, and how fast a ceasefire drains a fear premium was underweighted.

Where we have been wrong

The most instructive miss this year is not gold. In May the call was that Brent’s 90-day trailing average would exceed $95 by September 30 (M-026). When the June ceasefire landed and crude collapsed toward $70, it was logged as a high-conviction miss in progress. Then the ceasefire broke, crude surged past $95, and the prediction is alive again. No credit is claimed for the round trip. The whipsaw is the honest picture of forecasting an active war: the direction call has held, the path has been humbling twice.

New predictions logged this issue

• M-260728-01: The July Consumer Price Index gasoline index rises month over month, reversing June’s 9.7% decline. Resolves August 12. Confidence: high.
• M-260728-02: The AAA national average price of regular gasoline averages between $4.10 and $4.60 per gallon across the fourth quarter. Resolves December 31. Confidence: moderate. Reading at press time: about $4.06 on July 23, and rising.
• M-260728-03: California’s statewide average gasoline price crosses $6.00 per gallon on at least one daily AAA reading by November 30. Resolves November 30. Confidence: moderate. Current reading: roughly $5.40 as of early July.

Selected open predictions: zero Federal Reserve rate cuts in 2026 (M-020, resolves December 31, tracking in our favor, with three Fed officials formally dissenting in favor of a hike this month). Third-quarter mortgage average at or below 6.50% (M-260703-01, resolves September 30, tracking against us at roughly 6.54% across five July surveys). California median home price flat within 3% for the year (H-004, on track). 2026 gross domestic product below 1.5% (M-028, back in play after the second quarter slowed to exactly 1.5%).

What does the forecast matrix show?

Each entry reads: current level, then the 90-day view, then the 12-month view, then confidence. High confidence means the outcome is largely locked in by structure, such as refining capacity or tariff law. Moderate means the range is wide but the forces pushing on it are identifiable. Low means the variable is hostage to the war, where one announcement can move it 20% in a week in either direction. A low label is not a shrug. It tells you which numbers in your own planning can whipsaw. Notice the pattern: the crude oil row is low confidence, and the refining and tariff rows are high. That gap is this issue’s entire argument.

Sources for current levels: Energy Information Administration, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Freddie Mac, AAA, National Association of Home Builders, Department of the Treasury, IMF PortWatch, Reports on Housing by Steven Thomas, and market data as of July 23 to July 31, 2026.

Why do gasoline prices now have a higher floor?

Because roughly half a gallon’s price is crude oil and the other half is refining, distribution, and taxes, and the refining half has been repricing for two years in a way no peace deal reverses.

Here is the refining ledger. Since early 2025, the United States has closed or converted three major facilities: the LyondellBasell refinery in Houston at 263,800 barrels per day, closed in the first quarter of 2025; the Phillips 66 refinery in Los Angeles at 138,700 barrels per day, which ceased fuel production in late 2025; and the Valero refinery in Benicia, near San Francisco, at roughly 145,000 to 170,000 barrels per day depending on the measure, which ceased fuel production by April 2026. Call it 550,000 barrels per day, gone, in a year and a half. Go back to 2019 and the cumulative figure for closures and conversions exceeds 1.2 million barrels per day.

Capacity that closes in this industry does not reopen. A refinery is a multi-billion-dollar facility with permits that took decades to accumulate, in a policy environment openly planning for declining gasoline demand. No board approves rebuilding one. Demand has fallen far more slowly than the capacity built to serve it, and when supply retreats faster than demand, the adjustment happens through price.

The shock absorber is gone too. The most recent full reading, December 2025, showed the refineries still operating running at 94.8% of capacity, before the Benicia closure took effect. That sounds healthy until you understand what it means: there is no spare capacity to surge when something breaks. Every unplanned outage, every fire, every maintenance overrun now shows up directly at the pump. The Energy Information Administration projects national inventories of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel trending toward their lowest levels since 2000. Thin inventories plus full utilization is the recipe for price spikes on small disruptions.

Why is California the preview?

Because California is running this experiment ahead of the rest of the country, and it has already crossed from producing its own fuel to importing it.

The state had 23 refineries in 2000. It started 2024 with 14. By the end of this year it will have 11, and only five of those are large facilities producing meaningful volumes of transportation fuel. The two most recent closures alone remove roughly 18% of the state’s refining capacity, which pushes California’s in-state gasoline production below in-state demand.

That converts California to an import model, and here is where the war connects. California requires a special clean-burning gasoline blend that few refineries outside the state produce. The main outside suppliers capable of making it are large Asian refiners, principally in South Korea. Those refiners run on Middle Eastern crude, the same crude the Strait of Hormuz shutdown is choking. The backup supplier is scrambling for its own feedstock.

You can see the stress directly in the wholesale market. The premium that Los Angeles wholesale gasoline commands over the national futures benchmark averaged 27 cents per gallon in the spring of 2025. By May of this year it was 47.7 cents. Read that again: the cost of turning crude into California gasoline nearly doubled while a ceasefire was holding and crude sat near $70. That is what a supply problem looks like when nobody is shooting.

This is why the California pump-price prediction, the $6.00 crossing, is a refining prediction wearing a gasoline costume. California statewide prices touched $5.95 in April on refinery maintenance alone, with crude near $70. Crude spent late July between the mid $80s and $100.

What is The Wire?

The Wire is the framework this publication runs on. It is a four-step transmission chain that traces a global shock down to a local price, and it answers one question: what does an event on the other side of the world mean for your cost of living, your employer, and your local market? It is the same map, with the same checkpoints, in every issue, so each segment can be watched confirming or failing in the data as the months pass.

Here is how the chain looks over the next two to three quarters, stated as a hypothesis with checkpoints, because the July data that would confirm it has not been published yet.

• Step one, fuel to inflation. Confirmed mechanism, timing pending. June proved the pipe works. Crude collapsed in June and the June Consumer Price Index fell 0.4% within weeks, with gasoline down 9.7% in the month. The same pipe now runs in reverse. July’s crude surge has not yet appeared in any official inflation number. The July report arrives August 12, and that is the first checkpoint.
• Step two, fuel to households. Already visible. Wages grew 3.5% over the past year while headline inflation ran between 3.5% and 4.2%, which means the average worker’s purchasing power spent the year underwater and June’s improvement only just pulled it back to even. Every additional dollar at the pump comes out of discretionary spending. The June data shows the squeeze arriving on schedule: spending grew faster than income, and the personal saving rate fell to 2.7%. Note the fine print in the June inflation report: gasoline was still 26.7% more expensive than a year earlier even in the relief month.
• Step three, households to corporate margins. The forward test. This is the least proven link, and saying so plainly matters. Equities remain within a few percent of their record, so a profit squeeze is a forecast and not yet a fact. The mechanism runs through revenue rather than costs: for most companies outside trucking and airlines, fuel is a small direct expense, but their customers’ gas tanks compete with their products for the same paycheck. Watch third-quarter earnings from consumer-facing companies, and specifically their comments on lower-income customer behavior.
• Step four, margins to labor. Watch the exits, not the layoffs. If margins compress, the textbook says layoffs. This cycle has been rewriting that textbook. In June, unemployment fell to 4.2% while 720,000 people left the labor force and participation hit a five-year low. Layoff filings are near two-month lows. Companies are shrinking through attrition and hiring freezes, and displaced workers are exiting rather than filing. So the checkpoint here is not the unemployment rate. It is participation, hours, and the prime-age employment share.

Why is the Federal Reserve boxed in?

Because the inflation it is fighting now comes from energy supply and tariff law, and interest rates do not refine gasoline or repeal a tariff.

Inflation just printed its best month in years, 3.5% and falling, with core inflation at 2.6%. In an ordinary cycle that is a rate-cut setup. But the oil re-shock means the next several inflation prints likely get worse before they get better, and the bond market is positioned for it: the 10-year Treasury yield rose to roughly 4.66% and the 30-year to about 5.15% during July, in a soft inflation month, because bondholders price the energy pipeline and the deficit rather than the rearview data.

Here is what actually happened at the meeting, and it is more revealing than either clean outcome would have been. The Federal Reserve held at 3.50% to 3.75% by a divided 9 to 3 vote, with all three dissenters preferring to raise rates. The statement named the cause, citing elevated uncertainty owing partly to the conflict in the Middle East and inflation elevated in part from supply shocks including energy. Chair Kevin Warsh, handed the best inflation report in years earlier in the month, spent his press conference refusing to celebrate it, insisting that five years of above-target inflation cannot be cured by a single month of modest price declines. The bond market’s verdict came within the hour: long-term yields rose anyway, and by Friday the 30-year Treasury had touched 5.28%, its highest since 2007. The next day’s inflation report confirmed the box: the Fed’s preferred gauge eased to 3.7% headline and 3.3% core for June, real progress, delivered by exactly the June energy decline that July has already reversed.

And the one scheduled event that might have helped was cancelled. The 10% import surcharge was legally required to expire July 24, and it did. Its expiration would have cut the average effective tariff rate roughly in half, a genuine one-time disinflationary event. Instead, replacement tariffs of 10% to 12.5% took effect the same minute, covering 99% of imports, with no expiration date.

That is the box: energy inflation the Fed cannot fix with interest rates, tariff inflation that just became structural, a labor market too calm on the surface to justify emergency cuts, and a bond market that punishes any hint of easing. Mortgage rates, which price off that bond market, have been above 6.5% in every weekly survey since early July and closed the month at 6.66%.

How does Japan’s currency crisis affect United States mortgage rates?

Japan owns more United States government debt than any other country, roughly $1.1 trillion of it. When Japan sells Treasuries to defend the yen, American long-term yields rise, and mortgage rates price off those yields.

The yen sits near a 40-year low. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield touched 2.90% in mid-July, the highest since the 1990s. Tokyo’s April and May attempt to defend the currency was the largest intervention on record at ¥11.73 trillion, about $73 billion, and markets undid it within six weeks. Japan funds these operations partly by selling United States Treasuries, and it sold $29.6 billion of them in the first quarter alone.

The joint intervention, since confirmed by Japan’s Finance Ministry, put the United States Treasury in the market buying yen for the first time since the late 1990s. It reads less like a favor to Tokyo and more like Washington defending its own borrowing costs at the source. The scale remains estimated, and there is a genuine counterargument: at today’s yields, Japanese money returning home is rational rebalancing rather than crisis selling, and each intervention since 2022 has bought one to three months of calm. But a world where the United States has to help manage the yen to keep its own 30-year yield from breaking higher is a world with one less shock absorber. Next issue traces this wire end to end.

What are the three scenarios?

Three scenarios, with probabilities carried directly from the internal model rather than rounded into vague words.

• The Shock: 42%, the base case. The war grinds on or escalates, energy stays repriced, and the damage transmits through real incomes, then margins, then labor, with the labor damage showing up as exits and reduced hours rather than headline unemployment. The Fed holds or hikes into it. Housing demand stays pinned by mortgage rates above 6.5%.
• The Grind: 38%. Muddle-through. The conflict settles into a contained stalemate, oil ranges $80 to $95 rather than spiking, inflation runs 3% to 4%, the Fed holds all year, and the economy slows without breaking. Conviction in this path rose in June and fell back in July.
• The Resolution Path: 20%. A durable deal lands. June showed the full template: crude gives back 25% within two weeks, headline inflation follows within a month, and the Fed gets room to ease by year-end. The reason this is not weighted higher after being briefly realized in June: the deal already failed once, the mediating parties are further apart, and Iran’s leadership succession adds a layer nobody can model. Even here, refining capacity does not return, so the pump-price floor stays elevated relative to 2024 in every scenario.

What would prove this wrong?

The specific data that would force a reassessment, committed to in advance.

• On the energy thesis: Brent sustaining below $80 for 30 days alongside a signed, holding agreement would kill the crude leg. The Los Angeles wholesale gasoline premium falling back below 30 cents per gallon for a month would kill the refining leg, and that one would be a genuine surprise.
• On inflation: a July Consumer Price Index on August 12 showing gasoline flat or down month over month scores prediction M-260728-01 a miss and would mean the pass-through is weaker or slower than modeled.
• On the squeeze chain: third-quarter margins at consumer-facing companies holding or expanding, with labor force participation recovering above 61.8% and prime-age employment share regaining half its June drop, would falsify the transmission story.
• On the Fed: a cut this year scores the zero-cut prediction M-020 a miss and would signal the committee sees labor damage this model is not measuring.

What to watch in the next 30 days

• August 7, the July jobs report. Threshold: labor force participation below 61.4%.
• Late August or early September, the preliminary annual benchmark revision to the jobs numbers, a separate release that has run large and negative two years straight. Threshold: a revision worse than negative 500,000.
• The yen and Japan’s Treasury holdings. Thresholds: dollar-yen breaking back above the intervention zone near 160, monthly data showing Japanese Treasury holdings dropping meaningfully below $1.1 trillion, or any Bank of Japan rate hike.
• August 12, the July Consumer Price Index. Threshold: a positive gasoline component month over month.
• Weekly, the AAA national gasoline average at roughly $4.06 at its last verified reading on July 23, and the California average at about $5.40 as of early July. Thresholds: $4.25 national and $5.75 California.
• Continuous, the strike pause. It either formalizes into an agreement or breaks back into strikes. Oil will price whichever comes first, within hours.
• Continuous, strait traffic. Any sustained recovery in Strait of Hormuz transit calls toward the pre-crisis norm near 90 a day in PortWatch data is the earliest hard signal of real de-escalation, ahead of any announcement.

What does this mean market by market?

Tier-one coastal markets, including San Diego and coastal Orange County. The newest county data, dated July 20 and July 21, shows the coastal advantage ending. San Diego’s market time rose to 101 days, even with a year ago, and buyer demand hit its lowest July level since tracking began in 2012. Orange County rose to 102 days, now slower than last year and, outside the pandemic lockdown, its slowest reading since January 2019. The sharpest move is in luxury: San Diego’s segment above $2 million slowed from 121 days to 131 days to 152 days across the last two reports, with the tier between $4 million and $6 million at 293 days. That tier runs on confidence rather than mortgage rates, and the early-July escalation took the urgency out of it. The takeaway: the seller window in this tier is no longer merely narrowing, it has started to close, and pricing set in the spring is already stale.

If you own in this tier, a spring price is now a stale price. Book a discovery call and we will look at your specific situation against the last 30 days of closings in your neighborhood.

Tier-two growth metros across Texas, Florida, and the Southeast. These markets carry the national builder story: builder confidence at 34, below the neutral line for 15 straight months, with 37% of builders cutting prices at an average of 6%, per the National Association of Home Builders. Elevated inventory plus rate-sensitive buyers means fuel-driven inflation that keeps mortgage rates near or above 6.5% lands hardest here. The takeaway: negotiating power sits firmly with buyers, and builder incentives are the market’s honest price signal.

Rate-sensitive suburban and commuter markets. These are the double-exposure zones: household budgets take the pump-price hit and the mortgage-rate hit at once, and commuting distance converts directly into fuel cost. Affordability pressure keeps pushing priced-out buyers toward them, which supports primary-residence demand even as the commute gets more expensive. Discretionary demand is another story: second homes, resort property, and optional moves are the first purchases a fuel-and-uncertainty squeeze switches off. The takeaway: in a commuter market, price a primary residence to the affordability migration, and price anything discretionary to a thinner, slower buyer pool than last year.

Buyers and investors. The rate math is the whole game. Freddie Mac at 6.66% and rising means affordability worsens each week the war premium holds, but it also means less competition: demand in the coverage counties fell 5% to 7% in the latest two-week reads. If the Resolution Path lands, rates likely revisit the low 6s within a quarter, and the buyers who transacted during the fear window will have bought the dip in competition. If The Shock holds, prices in balanced markets drift flat to slightly down, which favors patient cash and punishes thin financing. The takeaway: underwrite at 7%, treat anything better as margin, and let the seller’s market-time statistics set your negotiating posture.

The bottom line

The war put a premium on crude, and a deal can take that premium away overnight. Nobody can rebuild 550,000 barrels per day of refining capacity overnight, and nobody is trying. That is the asymmetry to carry into the fall: fuel prices now have a higher floor in every scenario, the new tariffs made the other inflation leg permanent, and the Federal Reserve is holding a fire extinguisher in a flood.

Here is exactly when the world grades this. On August 12, the July inflation report grades the gasoline prediction M-260728-01 in public. On September 30, the third-quarter mortgage average settles the 6.50% call M-260703-01, currently running against us at 6.54%. And every week between now and November 30, the California pump price either advances toward the $6.00 prediction or walks away from it. The grade gets printed at the same size as the thesis, whichever way it goes.

Issue 4’s deep dive is already chosen: the Tokyo wire, how Japan’s fight to save the yen sets your mortgage rate, and why Washington just stepped into a currency market it has avoided for a generation.

Primary sources referenced in this report: U.S. Energy Information Administration refinery capacity data, Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index, Bureau of Economic Analysis personal income and outlays, Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey, AAA fuel price averages, Federal Reserve monetary policy releases, U.S. Department of the Treasury yield curve data, IMF PortWatch, National Association of Home Builders housing economics, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. County market data: Reports on Housing, Steven Thomas.

About the author

Ray Stendall is a market analyst turned broker who has tracked the Southern California market for more than 20 years and has been licensed since 2017. He built this publication on one conviction: the forces that decide what a home is worth, and when to act on it, do not start on your street. They start in oil corridors, bond markets, refineries, and central bank meeting rooms, and most people deciding whether to buy or sell never see the wire that connects those rooms to their front door. Each month he traces that wire in public, logs falsifiable predictions under The Wire framework, and scores himself on the record.

The companion publication, The Southern California Housing Brief, runs the same framework the rest of the way down, to specific counties, price tiers, and streets.